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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression 
identified by a federal court of appeals opinion announced between 
October 9, 2008 and March 13, 2009. This collection is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief 
analysis, and the court’s conclusion. It is intended to give only the 
briefest synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. If a circuit 
does not appear on the list, it means that the editors did not identify any 
cases from the circuit for the specified time period that presented an issue 
of First Impression. 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Sentencing Commission’s 2007 
amendment to the drug quantity table offers a remedy to a defendant 
who, “although convicted of a drug-trafficking offense involving crack 
cocaine, was ultimately sentenced as a career offender.” Id. at 7. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that Amendment 706 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines “adjusts downward by two levels the base offense 
level ascribed to various quantities of crack cocaine . . . thereby 
shrinking the guideline disparity between crack cocaine offenses and 
powdered cocaine offenses.” Id. at 9. However, because Defendant was a 
career offender, his sentence fell under an alternate sentencing table as 
well. Id. at 8. “If the offense level for a career offender . . . is greater than 
the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense level from the [career 
offender] table . . . shall apply.” Id. at 9–10. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit rejected Defendant’s argument that 
Amendment 706 lowered his actual sentencing range and held that his 
“actual sentencing range was produced by [the career offender 
guideline].” Id. at 11. 
 
Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether Title VII by including in the definition of 
employer, ‘any agent of such a person,’ intended for said ‘agents’ to be 
subject to liability for engaging in proscribed discriminatory acts?” Id. at 
29. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit had declined in previous cases to 
discuss this issue; however it noted that the majority of circuits hold that 
agents cannot be held personally liable under Title VII. Id. The court 
quoted the 9th Circuit’s decision in Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 
which states that the “statutory scheme itself indicates that Congress did 
not intend to impose individual liability on employees.” Id. The 1st 
Circuit joined the reasoning of the 7th Circuit in holding that the “1991 
amendments to Title VII further bolster our conclusion that individuals 
are not liable under that Act” because the amendments made no 
reference to the amount of damages an individual would be accountable. 
Id. at 30–31. 
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CONCLUSION: Thus, the 1st Circuit was persuaded by its sister 
circuits and concluded that “there is no individual employee liability 
under Title VII.” Id. at 31. 
 
Mejia-Rodriguez v. Holder, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3718 (1st Cir. Feb. 
25, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
erred in finding that (1) [petitioner] was not eligible for an exception to 
the inadmissibility rules for those who have committed certain crimes 
and that (2) he was ineligible for discretionary relief from removal by the 
Attorney General. The petition does involve one issue which this court 
has not addressed before: whether the term ‘maximum penalty possible,’ 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), is determined by the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines range or the relevant statutory range of 
imprisonment.” Id. at *1–2. 
ANALYSIS: The Court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) 
“makes no reference to the Sentencing Guidelines. The language of the 
statute plainly refers to the ‘maximum penalty possible’ and that 
maximum is set by statute. That maximum possible punishment is for 
‘the crime of which the alien was convicted,’ a reference again to the 
statute of conviction.” Id. at *8. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the term ‘maximum 
penalty possible’ is determined in reference to the relevant statutory 
range of imprisonment and not the federal Sentencing Guidelines range.” 
Id. at *1–2. 
 
Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether, under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) the bankruptcy court 
may enter an order excusing non-disclosure after the time for filing the 
required information has expired. Id. at 9. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed the automatic dismissal provision 
of BAPCPA, which states that “when a debtor fails to file all the 
information required by section 521(a)(1)(B) within the prescribed 
period of” 45 days, “the case shall be automatically dismissed.” Id. at 10. 
However, the court considered the term “automatic” a misnomer because 
the dismissal only takes place at the insistence of a party in interest. Id. at 
12. The court looked to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B), which provides that 
the debtor “‘shall . . . file’” the required disclosures “unless the court 
orders otherwise.” Id. at 14. The court found that because the bankruptcy 
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court had the flexibility to waive non-disclosure before the passage of 
BAPCPA and considering that BAPCPA did not expressly curtail that 
power, the bankruptcy court can use its discretion to excuse detailed 
disclosure and determine when such information becomes “irrelevant or 
extraneous.” Id. at 12. The court noted that a grant of judicial power to 
“order otherwise” predated BAPCPA, and when Congress updated 
section 521 it left that language intact. Id. at 12. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held, “that the great divide in section 
521 is between information that is required and information that is 
not. . . . The [BAPCPA] allows courts to do the sifting suggested by that 
divide without rigid adherence to the forty-five-day deadline.” Id.  
 
Northeastern Land Servs. v. NLRB, No. 08-1878, 2009 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 5267 (1st Cir. Mar. 13, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a two-member panel of the National Labor 
Relations Board (“Board”) constitutes a quorum under Section 3(b) of 
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). Id. at *2. 
ANALYSIS: The court first indicated that the Board can lawfully 
delegate its power to a two-member panel pursuant to the “plain text” of 
Section 3(b). Id. at *12–13. The court noted that the statute authorizes 
the Board to delegate its power to a three-member panel. Id. at *13. The 
court then observed that Section 3(b) specifically provides that any 
Board vacancy “shall not impair the right of the remaining members to 
exercise all of the powers of the Board.” Id. The court thus recognized 
that a vacancy in a three-member panel cannot impair the right of the 
remaining two members to exercise the full powers of the Board. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that a two-member panel of the 
Board constitutes a quorum. Id. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “communications passing between a 
government attorney without policy-making authority and a public 
official are protected by the attorney-client privilege when the 
communications evaluate the policies’ legality and propose alternatives.” 
Id. at 225. 
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ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[c]ourts have found waiver by 
implication when a client testifies concerning portions of the attorney-
client communication, when a client places the attorney-client 
relationship directly at issue, and when a client asserts reliance on an 
attorney’s advice as an element of a claim or defense.” Id. at 228. The 
court noted that the key to finding implied waiver in the third scenario is 
“some showing by the party arguing for a waiver that the opposing party 
relies on the privileged communication as a claim or defense or as an 
element of a claim or defense.” Id. The court further reasoned that the 
notion of unfairness underlies any determination that a privilege should 
be forfeited. Id. at 229. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that communications between 
a government attorney and a public official are not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege when the party asserting the privilege has relied 
on the advice of his counsel to make his claim or defense. Id. at 229. 
 
Overbaugh v. Household Bank N.A. (In re Overbaugh), 2009 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 5101 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a Chapter 13 trustee has standing to object to 
a motion to reclassify a claim from secured to un-secured. Id. at *12. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit determined that because 11 U.S.C. § 
1302 requires a trustee to properly disburse all claims, “a trustee has 
standing to object to the motion of a debtor to reclassify a secured 
creditor’s claims.” Id. The court then reasoned that “[b]ecause a trustee 
must be able to verify that secured claims are, in fact, secured, it 
necessarily follows that a trustee has standing to object when a debtor 
attempts to reclassify a secured claim as an unsecured claim.” Id. 
Following the approach taken by the 5th and 9th Circuits, the 2nd Circuit 
found that “when considering similar challenges to the authority of a 
Chapter 13 trustee, that the primary purpose of the Chapter 13 trustee is 
not just to serve the interests of the unsecured creditors, but rather, to 
serve the interests of all creditors.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “a Chapter 13 trustee—
who is charged with assuring that claims are properly disbursed [under] 
11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(3)—has standing to object to a motion to reclassify 
a claim.” Id. at *3. 
 
 
378 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:373 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the appropriate standard of review for 
appealing the first two factors of a Sell order to involuntarily medicate a 
defendant to render him competent for trial is de novo or clear error 
review. Id. at 598. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that their “sister circuits have 
specified standards of review for each factor of the Sell test.” Id. In 
accordance with their sister circuits, the 3rd Circuit agreed that the first 
factor of a Sell order, “whether the Government has advanced 
sufficiently important interests to justify forcible medication,” presents a 
legal question subject to de novo review. Id. The 3rd Circuit stated that 
the second factor of a Sell order, “whether involuntary medication is 
substantially likely to restore Grape to competency,” is a factual question 
subject to clear error review. Id. The court reasoned that “[d]etermining 
whether involuntary medication will significantly further [the proffered] 
state interests, including the medication’s likely effect on a defendant 
and his ability to stand trial and help prepare for it, requires us to resolve 
a factual question.” Id. Furthermore, the court held that the “Government 
bears the burden of proof on factual questions by clear and convincing 
evidence.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “[b]ecause we agree that 
the first issue presents a legal question, we will review the first Sell 
factor . . . de novo” and because the second factor presents a factual 
question, “[w]e therefore review the second Sell factor for clear error.” 
Id. 
 
Johnson v. Tennis, 549 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the rule of Bruton v. United States, holding 
that in a joint criminal jury trial, “a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation is violated by admitting a confession of a non-testifying 
codefendant that implicates the defendant, regardless of any limiting 
instruction given to the jury,” applies to “the incriminating confession of 
a non-testifying codefendant in a joint bench trial.” Id. at 298. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that Bruton was concerned with the 
“limitations of a jury that it would or could not follow instructions to 
disregard the prejudicial statements of a codefendant at a joint trial.” Id. 
2009] First Impressions 379 
at 299. The court recognized that the “the risks inherent in the jury 
system of which the Bruton Court was so concerned would seemingly 
not exist when a judge is sitting as a trier of fact.” Id. The court further 
noted that the Supreme Court’s “stated rationale . . . limited [the rule’s] 
application only to jury trials in criminal cases.” Id. at 300. The court 
observed that other appellate courts have addressed the scope of Bruton 
and limited the rule’s application to jury trials. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the “Bruton rule . . . 
applies solely to jury trials” and is thus “inapplicable to the incriminating 
confession of a non-testifying codefendant in a joint bench trial.” Id. 
 
Shubert v. Lucent Tech, Inc. (In re Winstar Communs., Inc.) 554 F.3d 
382 (3d Cir. 2009) 
 QUESTION: Whether “a creditor can be considered a non-
statutory insider for purposes of extending the time for recovery of 
preferential payments” under the Bankruptcy Code when the insider does 
not have actual control. Id. at 388, 396. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit rejected the appellant’s contention that 
“in order for a creditor to constitute an insider [that creditor] . . . must 
exercise actual managerial control over the debtor’s day to day 
operations.” Id. at 395. The court stated that instead of control, the 
relevant legal inquiry “is whether there is a close relationship [between 
the debtor and creditor] and . . . anything other than closeness to suggest 
that any transactions were not conducted at arm’s length.” Id. at 396. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that it is “not necessary 
that a non-statutory insider have actual control” for purposes of 
extending the time for recovery of preferential payments under the 
Bankruptcy Code. Id. 
 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Nat’l Gas Distribs., 
LLC), 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether commodity forward agreements must be 
traded on exchanges or in financial markets. Id. at 255. 
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit first noted that the word “agreement” is 
a more general term than “contract,” and thus every contract is an 
agreement, but not every agreement is a contract. Id. Further, since 
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forward contracts need not be traded on exchanges or in financial 
markets, it follows that some forward agreements need not be traded on 
exchanges or in financial markets. Id. at 256–57.  
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit thus held that commodity forward 
agreements do not need to be traded on exchanges or in financial 
markets. Id. at 257. 
 
Palisades Collections L.L.C. v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a party joined as a defendant to a 
counterclaim (the ‘additional counter-defendant’) may remove [a] case to 
federal court solely because the counterclaim satisfies the jurisdictional 
requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).” Id. at 
328. 
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit first noted that the general removal 
statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, only permits “the defendant or defendants” 
to remove a case to federal court. Id. at 331. The court further observed 
that CAFA conferred federal jurisdiction over civil actions in which the 
“matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.” Id. The 
4th Circuit examined the Supreme Court’s decision in Shamrock Oil, 
where the Supreme Court held that the original plaintiff was not 
authorized to remove a case to federal court. Id. at 332–33. Other courts, 
the 4th Circuit noted, have interpreted Shamrock Oil to mean that only 
the original defendants in a suit may file removal. Id. The 4th Circuit 
then agreed with the 6th Circuit’s reasoning that the wording in section 
1441, stating “defendant or defendants,” refers only to the original 
parties against whom the original plaintiff asserted the claim, and not to 
third-party defendants. Id. Furthermore, the 4th Circuit reasoned that if 
Congress had intended to allow additional counter-defendants to remove 
a case to federal court, then it would have so indicated in the statute. Id. 
at 333–34. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit thus held that additional counter-
defendants may not remove a case to federal court. Id. at 328–29. 
 
United States v. Wofford, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3519 (5th Cir. Feb. 
18, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether an employee retirement pension plan (“plan”) 
that fails to satisfy the requirements of § 401(a) for qualification at the 
relevant times is still a plan “subject to any provision of Title I” of 
ERISA for the purposes of § 664. Id. at *15. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that they previously held in the 
bankruptcy context that a plan’s failure to remain tax qualified does not 
render ERISA’s Title I anti-alienation provisions inapplicable. Id. at *15. 
The court also reviewed another prior decision where the court held that 
tax qualification is not a prerequisite to ERISA qualification. Id. at *17–
18. Reviewing that earlier decision, the court noted that “[n]owhere in 
ERISA . . . is there a requirement that, to be an ERISA plan and thus be 
governed by ERISA, a plan must be tax qualified.” Id. at *19. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that given the earlier precedents in 
the bankruptcy context, the district court correctly deemed tax 
qualification irrelevant to the issue of whether a plan was subject to any 
provision of Title I of ERISA. Id. at *22. 
 
Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels LLC, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 
4796 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether, under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”), “an employer must reimburse guest workers for (1) 
recruitment expenses, (2) transportation expenses, or (3) visa expenses, 
which the guest workers incurred before relocating to the employer's 
location.” Id. at *3. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit first noted that an employer must 
reimburse employees for “kick-backs.” Id. at *13–14. Further, a 
necessary condition of a “kick-back” is that it is primarily for the benefit 
of the employer. Id. at *14. Thus, finding that neither recruitment 
expenses, transportation expenses, nor visa expenses are primarily for the 
benefit of the employer, the court did not consider those expenses to be 
“kick-backs” and as such did not need to be reimbursed by the employer. 
Id. at *15–24.  
CONCLUSION: The court held that the FLSA does not require an 
employer to “reimburse its guest workers for the recruitment fees, 
transportation costs, or visa fees that they incurred before relocating to 
the United States.” Id. at *24. 
 
 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
LPP Mortgage, Ltd. v. Brinley, 547 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether, in bankruptcy cases, technical abandonment 
of property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 544 is revocable. Id. at 648. 
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ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit agreed with the limited discretion 
approach, that courts should have limited discretion in determining when 
technical abandonment can be revoked, that was taken by the bankruptcy 
court. Id. at 649 (noting the bankruptcy court’s reliance on the 10th 
Circuit’s decision in In re Woods, 173 F.3d 770 (10th Cir. 1999)). The 
court found that “the question of whether abandonment is revocable is to 
be determined by applying the guidelines of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b), made applicable to bankruptcy matters by Federal Rule 
of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024.” Id. The court concurred with the 
bankruptcy court’s finding that this approach promoted finality, debtor 
protection, due diligence, and flexibility. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that technical abandonment is 
revocable, finding that “[t]he application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) strikes 
the appropriate balance between promoting finality and allowing courts 
to grant relief in limited circumstances.” Id. 
 
Groeneveld Transport Efficiency v. Eisses, 297 Fed. Appx. 508 (6th 
Cir. Oct. 20, 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the plaintiffs may appeal the district court’s 
order, which temporarily stayed the district court action based on the 
doctrine of international abstention. Id. at 510. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit agreed with the 8th Circuit and held 
that a stay based on international abstention is not a final order. Id. The 
court relied on the 8th Circuit’s reasoning that since there was a lack of 
complete overlap in the U.S. and foreign litigation, and because the 
district court explicitly contemplated the possibility for further litigation 
in the U.S., the district court’s order was not final. Id. The court noted 
that in issuing its ruling, “the district court was not attempting to dispose 
of the case. Rather, recognizing the difficulty of trying a case with 
substantially similar parties and similar disputes in two fora, the district 
court decided to temporarily stay the action while the Canadian case 
proceeded.” Id. at 511. Thus, the court concluded that the district court’s 
stay cannot be considered a final order because the district court clearly 
based its ruling on the international abstention doctrine; and because the 
district court asked the plaintiffs to instruct the district court on whether 
the action should be “fully restored” in federal court after foreign 
resolution. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that a stay based on 
international abstention is not a final order. 
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Redmon v. Sud-Chemie Inc. Ret. Plan for Union Employees., 547 F.3d 
531 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the “Kentucky statute of limitations is most 
analogous to a claim for benefits under [29 U.S.C.] §1132(a)(1)(B)” of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Id. at 536 
n.8. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit noted that since ERISA “does not 
provide a statute of limitations for a claim of benefits under 
§1132(a)(1)(B) . . . the court [will] apply the most analogous state law 
statute of limitations.” Id. at 534. The court stated that a statute of 
limitations for breach of contract is most analogous where “no provision 
comparable to KRS §413.120(2) [the statutory liability provision] was 
before the court.” Id. at 535. However, the court explained that since 
appellant claimed that signature of waiver on the Designation of Form of 
Benefit Payments (“DFBP”) was obtained in violation of ERISA, this 
cause of action did not arise from an independent contract but “more 
specifically from ERISA’s statutory provisions.” Id. at 537. Therefore, 
the court recognized that KRS §413.120(2), which affixes a five-year 
statute of limitations, was applicable to defendant’s claim, not the state 
statute of limitations for breach of contract. Id. 
The court further reasoned that this finding was in accord with 
Kentucky case law, which held that KRS §413.120(2) was appropriate 
where a statute creates a new theory of liability unknown at common law 
such as the Worker’s Compensation scheme. Id. Because “ERISA is 
more akin to a statutory scheme such as Workers’ Compensation than to 
any common law cause of action,” the court found that the statutory 
liability provision [of Kentucky law] is the most analogous statute of 
limitations” for this claim. Id. at 538. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that KRS §413.120(2), the five-year 
statute of limitations, is the most analogous statute of limitations for a 
claim of benefits under [29 U.S.C.S.] §1132(a)(1)(B) ERISA. Id. at 537. 
 
Pickens v. Howes, 549 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant who pleads to an illegal sentence 
should be allowed to withdraw his plea even if a new sentence is ordered 
which is “both legal and gives him the entire benefit of the original plea.” 
Id. at 381. 
384 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:373 
 ANALYSIS: Generally, a defendant may withdraw a plea bargain 
calling for an illegal sentence. Id. at 381. “The court found that 
defendant’s Due Process rights were not violated when the illegal 
sentence was modified to comply with both the law and the sentencing 
terms of the plea agreement.” Id. Allowing the defendant to withdraw his 
plea and requiring the state to retry the case would have been both 
unnecessary and unfair. Id. at 381–82. 
CONCLUSION: “[W]hen a sentence is modified to make it 
consistent with state law and to give the defendant the benefit of his 
original plea agreement, the Constitution does not require the withdrawal 
of a once-illegal plea.” Id. 
 
United States v. Sanders, 301 Fed. Appx. 503 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “aggravated riot,” an offense not specifically 
identified as a crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), can be considered a violent offense for the purposes 
of sentencing enhancement. Id. at 506. 
ANALYSIS: After reviewing the statutory language at issue, the 
court recognized “that offenses that qualify as ‘aggravated riot’ in Ohio 
[do not] necessarily qualify as ‘crimes of violence’ under U.S.S.G. § 
4B1.2(a)(1).” Id. The court then considered “whether aggravated riot is a 
crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) because it ‘presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” Id. In considering 
this question, the court recognized “that the relevant inquiry must focus 
‘on whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in 
the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.’” 
Id. 507. “Because the statute in question here contains elements that 
expressly distinguish conduct with a risk of violence under [the Ohio 
statute] subsections (A)(2) and (3) from other kinds of disorderly conduct 
committed in the course of non-violent felonies under subsection (A)(1), 
aggravated riot does not appear to be a crime of violence in all cases.” Id. 
The court recognized that it was “not restricted to a mere examination of 
the statutory language but [it was] permitted to look at the charging 
documents and jury instructions to determine the actual elements of the 
crime committed.” Id. at *11. The court opined that “the language of the 
indictment is identical to the statutory language, revealing that [the 
defendant’s] prior conviction was undoubtedly for a violation of either 
subsection (A)(2) or (A)(3) of the Ohio aggravated-riot statue, both of 
which are crimes of violence . . . .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Although ‘aggravated riot’ is not necessarily a 
crime of violence pursuant to statutory language alone, [the court’s] 
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review of [the defendant’s] indictment establishe[d] that he was charged 
and convicted of an offense that, under a subsection of Ohio’s aggravated 
riot statute, constitutes a crime of violence for federal sentencing 
purposes.” Id.  
 
Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 
F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a federal court should abstain from exercising 
jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration because of international 
comity concerns. Id. at 465. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States to 
determine the proper factors to consider when making the decision to 
abstain from exercising jurisdiction when international comity is a 
concern. Id. at 467. In Colorado River, the Supreme Court noted that the 
most important factor in an abstention decision is “whether there exists a 
‘clear federal policy evince[ing] . . . the avoidance of piecemeal 
adjudication.’” Id. “How far the parallel proceeding has advanced in the 
other sovereign’s courts, the number of defendants and complexity of the 
proceeding, the convenience of the parties, and whether a foreign 
sovereign is participating in the suit” were other factors considered by 
the Supreme Court. Id. The 6th Circuit noted that the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”), which applies to the dispute between the parties, did not 
promote the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication. Id. 468. In fact, the 
FAA recognized that piecemeal adjudication may be necessary to 
“‘enforce private agreements into which parties had entered.’” Id. 
Further, the court noted that the foreign litigation was only in the 
beginning stages and convenience is not a factor because the parties are 
located in two different countries to begin with so either location will be 
inconvenient for half of the parties involved. Id. 469.  
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that it would not abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration because of 
international comity concerns after carefully considering the factors laid 
out by the Supreme Court in Colorado River. Id. 
 
United States v. Shafer, 557 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the term “sexual contact” in 18 U.S.C. § 
2246(3) includes self-masturbation. Id. at 444. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit emphasized that “a matter requiring 
statutory interpretation is a question of law requiring de novo review, and 
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the starting point for interpretation is the language of the statute itself.” 
Id. at 445. The court pointed out that absent clear legislative intent to the 
contrary, the statutory wording is generally conclusive. Id. Section 
2246(3) defines “sexual contact” as “the intentional touching . . . of any 
person . . . .” Id. Given the definition, the court found that the text of 
section 2246(3) does not support a holding that more than one person is 
required for “sexual contact” to occur. However, the court said that 
“simply because the statute does not specifically state that self-
masturbation qualifies as ‘sexual contact’ does not mean that Congress 
intended for such an act to be excluded, especially when self-
masturbation falls squarely within the plain language of [section] 
2246(3).” Id. at 445–46.  
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a clear reading of section 
2246(3) requires a holding “that ‘sexual contact,’ as defined by [section] 
2246(3), includes self-masturbation.” Id. at 446. 
 
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Jimenez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether criminal recklessness constitutes a crime of 
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Id. at 558. 
 ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the Supreme Court, after 
examining the scope of section 16(b) and holding that a conviction for 
drunk driving did not constitute a crime of violence, reasoned that 
accidental or negligent conduct should not fall under the definition of a 
crime of violence. Id. at 560. The court then recognized that five other 
circuits (the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th, and 10th) have held that reckless crimes 
cannot be crimes of violence under section 16(b). Id. The court adopted 
the 3rd Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling that the 
concept of physical force necessary to constitute a crime of violence 
“naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely 
accidental conduct.” Id. In the present case, the crime of criminal 
recklessness in Indiana for which the respondent was convicted 
encompasses both accidental and aggressive conduct. It therefore is not a 
crime of violence which requires a higher level of “intent to use force” 
than criminal recklessness requires. Id. at 562.      
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding 
that reckless crimes are not crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 
Id. at 560. 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
UnitedHealth Group Inc. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 548 F.3d 1124 (8th 
Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION:  Whether the plain language of Section 504(i) of the 
indenture in question, or the manifest purposes of the parties “imposes an 
independent obligation on the company to file timely SEC reports . . . 
and within fifteen days afterwards, to forward copies of such reports to 
the trustee.” Id. at 1128. 
ANALYSIS:  The court first noted that “the plain language of 
[section] 504(i) makes clear that any duty actually to file the reports is 
imposed ‘pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act’ and not 
pursuant to the indenture itself,” and thus the “provision does not 
incorporate the Exchange Act,” but “merely refers to it in order to 
establish which reports must be forwarded.” Id. at 1128–29.  The court 
rejected the argument that the purpose of the provision was to impose an 
independent filing obligation. Id. at 1130.   
The court noted that the “clear and unambiguous language of the 
indenture provision” at issue imposed nothing more than the ministerial 
duty to forward copies of certain reports . . . within fifteen days of 
actually filing the reports with the SEC.” Id. at 1130. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit thus held that “[b]ased on the plain 
meaning of [section] 504(i) . . . the indenture imposes no independent 
obligation to file timely SEC reports.” Id. 
 
H&R Block, Inc., v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 546 F.3d 937 
(8th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether class actions filed against nationwide tax 
preparer H&R Block (‘Block’) asserting a variety of statutory and 
common law claims arising out of Block’s Refund Anticipation Loan 
(“RAL”) program are excluded from ‘prior acts’ coverage under 
professional liability ‘claims made’ insurance policies because other 
class actions asserting similar claims were filed prior to the policy 
periods.”  Id. at 938. 
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit noted that “the very purpose of 
insurance is to protect against the risk of unknown but not unexpected 
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loss.” Id. at 941. The court indicated that the provisions  at issue 
provided coverage for “‘claims based on a wrongful act that occurred 
before the effective date of the policy’” as long as the insurer “‘had no 
knowledge of the prior wrongful act on the effective date’” of the policy, 
“nor any reasonable way to foresee that a claim might be brought.” Id. at 
942.  The court stated that in order for plaintiffs to have class action 
standing, they “must allege and undertake to prove that each class 
member was injured by the same wrongful act or acts.” Id. The court 
further found that when a service is sold nationwide, claims premised on 
the RAL program put the insurer on “reasonable notice that other clients 
will assert the same claims alleging that the same ‘wrongful acts’ 
infected their individual transactions.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that where class action lawsuits 
have already been filed against the insured for prior acts, and before the 
policy periods begin, these suits give the insured both the required 
knowledge of its prior wrongful acts as well as a reasonable opportunity 
to foresee that such may be brought in the future.  Id. at 943. 
 
Solis v. Summit Contrs., Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3755 (8th Cir. 
Jan. 17, 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(a) was unambiguous in 
that it did not preclude OSHA from issuing citations to general 
contractors when their subcontractors caused a condition exposing their 
employees to danger. Id. at *16. 
ANALYSIS: Summit argued that: “the regulation requires the 
employer to protect only ‘his employees.’ Because creating employer, 
correcting employer, and controlling employer citation policies permit 
OSHA to issue citations to employers when their own employees are not 
exposed to the hazard, Summit’s reading of § 1910.12(a) effectively 
precludes these policies and only permits the exposing employer citation 
policy. Although part (1) may support this interpretation, part (2) must 
provide something different to avoid being superfluous to part (1). 
Summit argues that part (2) requires the employer to protect only his 
employees at their places of employment.” Id. at *22–23.  The court 
found that Summit’s position on 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(a) presented two 
problems: “First, Summit’s interpretation is contrary to the grammatical 
construction of the sentence because it requires the term ‘each of his 
employees’ to be the object of the sentence, rather than a prepositional 
phrase that modifies the actual objects of the sentence. Second, Summit’s 
interpretation would make the term ‘places of employment’ redundant of 
the term ‘employment’ and, therefore, superfluous. Under Summit’s 
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interpretation, part (2) provides nothing different from or in addition to 
part (1); instead, it makes the term ‘places of employment’ a subset of 
the term ‘employment.’” Id. at *23. The court further found that even if it 
agreed with Summit’s position, it would have to defer to the Secretary’s 
interpretation. Id. at *24. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the OSHRC’s finding that 
OSHA could not fine general contractors under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(a) 
for the acts of its subcontractors to be “contrary to law.” Id. at *37. 
 
 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a federal honest services mail fraud 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346 requires proof that the 
conduct at issue also violated an applicable state law.” Id. at 1239. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first noted that the language of 18 
U.S.C. § 1341 “criminalizes the use of the postal services in carrying out 
a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representatives, or promises.’” Id. 
at 1243. The court then stated that Congress clarified for purposes of 
section 1341 that “the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a 
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services.” Id. However, the court acknowledged that Congress did not 
define the concept of “honest services,” creating confusion over the 
reach of section 1341. Id. The 9th Circuit declined to adopt the 5th 
Circuit’s “‘state law limiting principle,’ which requires the government 
to prove that a public official violated an independent state law to 
support an honest services mail fraud conviction,” because prior case law 
does not support the proposition that the federal fraud statute derives its 
content solely from state law. Id. at 1243–45. Rather, the statutory text, 
legislative history, and cases’ “[b]road characterization of . . . duty, 
without reference to any underlying state law duty, suggests that public 
officials’ duty of honesty is uniform rather than variable by state.” Id. at 
1245–46.  The court also noted that “[f]ederal action based on a valid 
constitutional grant of authority is not improper simply because it 
intrudes on state interests.” Id. at 1246. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit rejected the principle that a state law 
violation is required for prosecution of federal honest services mail fraud 
under 18 U.S.C. 1341 and ultimately recognized that the “two core 
categories of conduct by public officials . . . that support an honest 
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services conviction” [are] (1) taking a bribe or otherwise being paid for a 
decision while purporting to be exercising independent discretion and (2) 
nondisclosure of material information.” Id. at 1247. 
 
Ahmed v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Department of Homeland Security can 
unilaterally block or veto a motion to reopen the proceedings for an 
adjustment of immigration status in an immigration proceeding. Id. at 
772. 
ANALYSIS: The Board of Immigration Appeals initially denied the 
plaintiff’s motion to reopen her immigration proceedings merely because 
the Department of Homeland Security objected to it. Id. at 770. The court 
found that the Department of Homeland Security does not have 
automatic veto power when objecting to a motion to reopen immigration 
proceedings. Id. at 772. Instead, the Board of Immigration Appeals may 
consider the Department’s objection, but does not have to. Id. 
CONCLUSION: When the Department of Homeland Security 
opposes a motion to reopen immigration proceedings for adjustment of 
status, the Board of Immigration Appeals may consider the objection, but 
may not deny the motion based solely on the fact of the Department’s 
objection. Id. 
 
United States v. Contreras-Cisneros, 297 Fed. Appx. 659 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a double jeopardy claim can provide for an 
exception to the rule permitting successive state and federal prosecutions. 
Id. at 661. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit emphasized that a “double jeopardy 
claim must fail unless it falls within an exception to the rule permitting 
successive state and federal prosecutions.” Id. The court pointed out that 
although a state prosecution might serve the interests of the federal 
government in maintaining secrecy in an ongoing DEA investigation, 
“these circumstances do not justify the conclusion that the state 
prosecution was ‘merely a tool of the federal authorities’ such that the 
initial prosecution was ‘in essential fact another federal prosecution.’” 
Id. The court added that the exception would not apply if “the state 
remained an independent sovereign pursuing its own sovereign interests 
throughout the state prosecution.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “that in theory [a ‘tool’ or 
‘cover’] exception does exist. As a practical matter, however . . . it is 
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extremely difficult and highly unusual to prove that a prosecution by one 
government is a tool, a sham, or a cover for the other government.” Id. 
 
Delgado v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) grants the Attorney 
General the authority to “determine a crime to be particularly serious 
regardless of the penalty or its designation or non-designation as an 
aggravated felony.” Id. at 1020. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that an alien is not eligible 
for withholding of removal if the Attorney General determines the alien 
committed a “particularly serious crime.” Id. at 1019–20. The court 
explained that under § 1231(b)(3)(B) aggravated felonies are 
“particularly serious crimes.” Id. at 1019. Although aggravated felonies 
constitute “particularly serious crimes” per se, the court found that the 
Attorney General is not precluded from deciding “on a case-by-case 
basis, that any other crime is also ‘particularly serious.’” Id. at 1019, 
1021. First, the court analyzed the legislative history of section 
1231(b)(3)(B) and concluded that “[n]othing in the text or history . . . 
suggests that Congress intended . . . to divest the Attorney General of his 
authority to determine, on a case-by-case basis, that other crimes were 
‘particularly serious,’ depending on the circumstances of [the alien’s] 
commission, among other things.” Id. at 1021. Accordingly, the court 
deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), stating the 
“BIA’s interpretation of the statute [was] reasonable.” Id. at 1022. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the Attorney General has 
“discretion to determine that, under the circumstances presented by an 
individual case, a crime was ‘particularly serious,’ whether or not the 
crime was an aggravated felony.” Id. 
 
United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether the use of another’s signature constitutes a 
“means of identification” for purposes of the Aggravated Identity Theft 
statute,” codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Id. at 886. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit considered the language of the statute to 
determine whether a signature qualifies as a “means of identification.” 
Id. at 887. The court noted the “Aggravated Identity Theft statute defines 
the term ‘means of identification’ in a way that makes reasonably clear 
that forging another’s signature on a check constitutes the use of a means 
of identification.” Id. The court stated that the “definition includes the 
use of a name, alone or in conjunction with any other information, as 
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constituting the use of a means of identification so long as the 
information taken as a whole identifies a specific individual.” Id. “By 
using the word ‘any’ to qualify the term ‘name,’ the statute reflects 
Congress’s intention to construct an expansive definition.” Id. The court 
found that “categorically carving out a signature from this definition” 
would “impermissibly narrow the definition of ‘name’ in the statute.” Id.  
CONCLUSION:  The 9th Circuit held that “forging another’s 
signature constitutes the use of that person’s name and thus qualifies as a 
‘means of identification’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.” Id. at 886. 
 
Fones4all Corp. v. FCC, 550 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the FCC may backdate an order explaining a 
denial of a “petition for forbearance from the application of an FCC 
regulation” to the date of an earlier press release announcing said 
decision. Id. at 813. 
ANALYSIS: The court interpreted 47 U.S.C. § 405 as requiring a 
party challenging the FCC’s practice of backdating a Memorandum 
Opinion in order to comply with the timeliness requirements of 47 
U.S.C. § 160(c) to first present their argument to the Commission before 
seeking judicial relief. Id. at 817. The court reasoned that the specific 
language of 47 U.S.C. § 405 “explicitly mandate[s] that the FCC have 
the ‘opportunity to pass’ on the merits of any challenges to its orders 
before review may be sought in the Courts of Appeals.” Id. at 818. The 
court noted that the D.C. Circuit had already “twice encountered a 
similar set of facts involving backdating,” and in both cases held that the 
court could not claim jurisdiction until the petitioners exhausted the 
administrative remedy of presenting their argument to the FCC. Id. at 
817. The court further noted that the Supreme Court has held that such 
“exhaustion ‘serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative 
agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.’” Id. at 817–18.  
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit joined with the D.C. Circuit in 
holding that 47 U.S.C. § 405 requires a petitioner to afford the FCC the 
opportunity to pass on questions involving the backdating of FCC orders 
before the petitioner may seek judicial relief.  Id. at 818. 
 
United States v. Youssef, 547 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a), which imposes fines 
and/or imprisonment for knowingly making false statements “relating to 
naturalization, citizenship, or registry of aliens,” includes a materiality 
requirement as an element of the offense. Id. at 1092–93. 
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ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first analyzed the plain language of the 
statute. Id. at 1093. The court followed the 4th Circuit and held that the 
plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) does not require the false statements to 
be material. Id. at 1093–94. Next, the court addressed whether the 
language used in 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) has a “settled meaning at common 
law requiring proof of materiality.” Id. at 1094. The court determined 
that “[n]one of the words used in 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) have an 
established meaning at common law that includes a materiality 
requirement.” Id. Furthermore, the court noted that “[w]here Congress 
has intended to criminalize the making of material false statements, it has 
expressly done so.” Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that Congress did 
not intend to impose a materiality requirement as an element of 18 
U.S.C. § 1015(a) and, consequently, the court would not read such a 
requirement into the statute. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) does not 
impose a materiality requirement for false statements made “under oath, 
in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to, or under, or by virtue of 
any law of the United States relating to naturalization, citizenship, or 
registry of aliens.” Id. at 1093–94. 
 
Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th 
Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether courts should apply a strict level of scrutiny 
when reviewing video games for minors that include violent material or 
apply the “variable obscenity.” Id. at 958. 
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court previously held that the standard 
for reviewing acts that deal with “obscenity as to minors” is akin to the 
rational basis standard. Id. at 959. The 9th Circuit thus addressed whether 
they should use such a standard when reviewing video games for minors 
that include violent material. Id. at 958. The 9th Circuit discussed the 
resistance by the 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits in broadening the term 
obscenity “to include violent material, as well as sexually explicit 
material.” Id. at 959. These circuits did not extend their obscenity 
jurisprudence to violent material because the two were “distinct 
categories of objectionable depiction.” Id. at 959. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit thus “declined the State’s invitation 
to apply the Ginsberg rationale to materials depicting violence, and 
[held] that strict scrutiny remains the applicable review standard.” Id. at 
961. 
 
394 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:373 
 
United States v. James, 556 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 
(“FJDA”) requires every charge brought against a juvenile tried as an 
adult to be the subject of a juvenile transfer hearing.” Id. at 1065. 
ANALYSIS: The defendant argued that the FJDA “does not allow 
the trial of a juvenile as an adult on charges that have not been the 
subject of a transfer hearing.” Id. at 1065. The court began its analysis by 
looking at the text of the statute and found that “[o]nce the court has 
determined that a juvenile should be tried as an adult, requiring an 
additional hearing to determine whether related charges added later meet 
the same standards would serve little purpose.” Id. at 1066. The court 
further reasoned that no hearing was required “to identify the newly 
added offenses or to ascertain the juvenile’s age, both currently and at 
the time he allegedly committed the offenses.” Id. The court set forth the 
standards for the district court to considering, including “the individual 
characteristics of the juvenile himself rather than the details of the 
offenses, and those characteristics were already the subject of the first 
hearing. If the added charges arise from the same series of acts as the 
original charges . . . the interest of justice analysis should remain 
unchanged.” Id. at 1066 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the FJDA . . . does not require 
that charges added after a juvenile has been transferred to adult status be 
the subject of an additional juvenile transfer hearing.” Id. at 1063. 
 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: The applicable standard of review for an appellate 
court when determining whether to grant a petition for permission to 
appeal from an order granting or denying class action certification under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Id. at 1261–62. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that while appellate courts have 
“limited capacity” to consider such interlocutory appeals, “certain 
instances exist . . . in which interlocutory review of a district court’s class 
certification decision is appropriate.” Id. at 1263. As there is “no rigid 
test” governing the “exercise of [the court’s] discretion to grant a petition 
of interlocutory review,” the 10th Circuit proffered a set of principles 
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“useful in evaluating the merits of a Rule 23(f) petition.” Id. The court 
enumerated three situations where interlocutory review of a district 
court’s class certification order is appropriate: (1) “death knell cases,” 
referring to situations in which a questionable class certification order “is 
likely to force either a plaintiff or defendant to resolve the case based on 
considerations independent of the merits;” (2) when there is “an interest 
in facilitating the development of the law,” and (3) whether the district 
court’s decision is “manifestly erroneous.” Id. The 10th Circuit reasoned 
that while most cases “ripe for consideration under Rule 23(f) will 
normally fall into one of these three categories,” appellate courts have 
broad discretion to review such petitions, and therefore a “rule that 
would clearly delineate every instance” of interlocutory review is 
inappropriate. Id. at 1264. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that when determining 
whether to grant a petition for permission to appeal an order granting or 
denying class action certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), 
appellate courts have broad discretion in granting or denying petitions for 
interlocutory review, and must “exercise their best judgment” in making 
such decisions rather than strictly adhering to the three categories of 
cases. Id. 
 
Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: The appropriate test for determining “whether a state 
proceeding is remedial or coercive,” so as to qualify as an ongoing state 
proceeding that is “due the deference accorded by Younger abstention” in 
deciding “whether a federal district court must abstain” from hearing a 
case where the “federal plaintiff has previously requested a hearing and 
received a final order regarding an agency’s decision to terminate 
benefits.” Id. at 887–88. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit referred to the test set forth by the 1st 
Circuit for deciding whether the type of proceeding is remedial or 
coercive. Id. at 889. The 1st Circuit test involves differentiating between 
(1) “whether the federal plaintiff initiated the state proceeding of her own 
volition to right a wrong inflicted by the state (a remedial proceeding) or 
whether the state initiated the proceeding against her, making her 
participation mandatory (a coercive proceeding)” and (2) “where the 
federal plaintiff contends that the state proceeding is unlawful (coercive) 
from cases where the federal plaintiff seeks a remedy for some other 
state-inflicted wrong (remedial).” Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that Brown’s court 
administrative proceedings were “not the type of proceeding entitled to 
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Younger deference” because Brown initiated the proceeding after her 
benefits were terminated and there was no compulsion by the state to 
participate in the proceedings. Id.  
 
United States v. Poe, 556 F. 3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether bounty hunters constitute state actors for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment when they conduct a search in the 
course of seeking out a bail-jumper. Id. at 1117. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit confirmed that the Fourth Amendment 
protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures by state actors.” Id. 
at 1123. The court held, however, that “[w]hen a private individual 
conducts a search not acting as, or in concert with, a government agent, 
the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, no matter how unreasonable 
the search.” Id. The court reasoned that there might be some instances 
where a search by a private citizen transforms into a governmental search 
thereby implicating the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
The court applied a two-prong approach “to decide if a search by a 
private individual constitutes state action” under the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. The first prong asks “whether the government knew of and 
acquiesced in the [individual’s] intrusive conduct.” Id. The second prong 
considers “whether the party performing the search intended to assist law 
enforcement efforts or to further his own ends.” Id. The court insisted 
that both prongs must be satisfied “considering the totality of the 
circumstances” for the private search to be transformed into a 
government search. Id.  
The 10th Circuit reasoned that if the government agent is involved 
“merely as a witness . . . the after-the-fact involvement of the police does 
not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1124. Furthermore, 
“involvement in the bail bonds industry is insufficient to satisfy this 
inquiry.” Id. The court required “knowledge of or acquiescence in the 
challenged search.” Id. Finally, the court reasoned that private conduct 
will not amount to state action if the bounty hunters “had a ‘legitimate, 
independent motivation’ to conduct the search,” such as financial gain. 
Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “bounty hunters do not 
qualify as state actors when . . . they act without the assistance of law 
enforcement and for their own pecuniary interests.” Id. at 1117. 
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United States v. Dozier, 555 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “the sentence imposed following the 
revocation of a defendant’s probation is a prior sentence within the 
meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1,” when “the conduct resulting in the 
revocation of his probation is the same conduct that forms the basis of 
the instant offense.” Id. at 1139 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit first noted that “incarceration resulting 
from a probation revocation is punishment for the original offense.” Id. 
at 1140. Further, “[w]here probation is revoked based on the same 
conduct forming the basis of a federal offense, the imposition of the 
original sentence is attributable to the original act of conviction, [and] 
not the act underlying the revocation.” Id. at 1141.  
CONCLUSION: Thus, the court held that the sentence imposed 
following the revocation of a defendant’s probation is a prior sentence 
under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, even when the conduct which leads to the 
revocation of the defendant’s probation is the same conduct that forms 
the basis of the instant offense. Id.  
 
Teton Millwork Sales v. Schlossberg, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2578 
(10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the Barton doctrine applies to deny a federal 
court jurisdiction to hear a claim against a court appointed receiver 
where the appointing court has not given permission and the plaintiff 
alleges that a receiver wrongfully seized his or her assets. Id. at *6. 
ANALYSIS: The general rule under the Barton doctrine states “that 
before suit is brought against a receiver[,] leave of the court by which 
[the receiver] was appointed must be obtained.” Id. However, “if, by 
mistake or wrongfully, the receiver takes possession of property 
belonging to another, such person may bring suit therefor against him 
personally as a matter of right; for in such case the receiver would be 
acting [outside the scope of her duties].” Id. When a plaintiff alleges that 
a receiver wrongfully seized his or her assets, a federal court has 
jurisdiction without permission from the appointing court. Id. at *5–6. 
CONCLUSION: Thus the 10th Circuit held that if a plaintiff alleges 
that a receiver wrongfully seized his or her assets, the Barton doctrine 
does not bar federal jurisdiction, even without permission from the 
appointing court. Id. at *6–7. 
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Hemispherx Biopharma Inc. v. Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investments, 553 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether individuals or entities without a beneficial 
ownership interest in a company’s securities can nonetheless become 
members of a ‘group’ within the meaning of [the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934] section 13(d)(3)” and thus are required to comply 
with the reporting requirements of section 13(d)(1). Id. at 1361. 
ANALYSIS: Section 13(d) requires persons owning more than five 
percent of the stock of a publicly traded company, to “disclose certain 
information to the issuer of the stock, the exchanges on which the stock 
is traded and the SEC.” Id. at 1361. Section 13(d)(3) provides that 
partnerships and other groups are considered a “person” under section 
13(d), but the statute is silent on “whether beneficial ownership of stock 
is required for group membership within the meaning of paragraph 
(d)(3).” Id. at 1363. The 11th Circuit concluded that the purpose of 
section 13(d)(3) “is to prevent persons who already have attained 
beneficial ownership of some amount of an issuer’s securities from 
combining to control over five percent of a class of securities, yet 
ducking the reporting requirement in section 13(d)(1).” Id at 1364. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that, “a beneficial 
ownership interest in securities is necessary to become a member of a 
group within the meaning of section 13(d)(3) of the Exchange Act.” Id. 
at 1366. 
 
Singh v. Attorney General, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248 (11th Cir. 
Mar. 10, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a state’s conviction of a minor in adult court 
is considered a conviction for purposes of deportation under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Id. at *6.  
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit examined the plain language of INA § 
101(a)(48)(A), which requires that “an alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony, such as burglary, at any time after admission is 
deportable.” Id. The statute defines a “conviction” as a “formal judgment 
of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been 
withheld, where a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has 
entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient 
facts to warrant a finding of guilt.” Id. In following the 1st, 2nd and 9th 
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Circuits, the 11th Circuit determined that “because the INA’s definition 
of conviction [is] clear and unambiguous,” the court is “bound by the 
state court’s determination to adjudicate the petitioner as an adult.” Id. at 
*7. The court noted that Immigration and Naturalization Services need 
not be bound by the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, which does not 
allow for an individual to be transferred to adult court if he committed a 
non-violent crime and that “if Congress had wanted the INS to follow the 
[Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act] at all times, it would have so stated.” 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that an alien’s conviction as 
an “adult in court is a conviction for immigration purposes, even though 
he was a minor at the time.”  Id. at *8. 
 
United States v. Harrison, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3014 (11th Cir. Feb. 
19, 2009) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a § 316.1935(2) conviction qualifie[d] as a 
violent felony for purposes of” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) (“Armed 
Career Criminal Act”). Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court described the behavior ordinarily underlying 
§ 316.1935(2) as: “(1) a law enforcement vehicle, with its siren and 
lights activated, signal[ing] the motorist to stop and (2) the motorist 
willfully refus[ing] or fail[ing] to stop the vehicle.” Id. at *38. The court 
noted that such a crime did “not involve the same high level of risk” as 
the crimes enumerated in the residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at 
*41. Furthermore, the court held that to be similar in kind to the 
enumerated offenses, conduct underlying § 316.1935(2) had to be 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive. Id. at *45. The court, in comparison, 
held that disobeying an officer’s signal and continuing to drive without  
more, such as “high speed or reckless conduct, [was] not sufficiently 
aggressive and violent enough to be” similar in kind to the enumerated 
Armed Career Crimes Act crimes. Id. at *45–46. 
CONCLUSION: Thus, the court ruled that a § 316.1935(2) crime did 
not qualify as a violent felony for the purposes of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act. Id. at *47.  
 
Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a corporation constitutes a person “permitted 
to be a lawful beneficiary of a pay-on-death account under section 
655.82 of the Florida Statutes.” Id. at *2. 
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ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit interpreted section 655.82 in 
accordance with its plain language, and because it does not include a 
definition of the word person, the court looked to “related statutory 
provisions” that provide such a definition.  Id. at *5–6. The court found 
that the definition of the term person in section 1.01(3) of the Florida 
Statutes includes corporations, and therefore a beneficiary of a pay-on-
death account may be a corporation. Id. at *6–7.  
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that because the context of 
section 655.82 permits the use of the word “person” as defined in section 
1.01(3) to include corporations, “a beneficiary of a pay-on-death account 
may be a corporation.” Id. at *7. 
 
McCloud v. Hooks, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4125 (11th Cir. Mar. 2, 
2009) 
QUESTION:  “[W]hether multiple charges consolidated under 
Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3 remain consolidated on appeal 
when a defendant pleads guilty to one charge, is convicted by a jury on 
another charge, and two separate judgments are entered against the 
defendant.” Id. at *14.  
ANALYSIS:  The court first noted that the state trial court sentenced 
McCloud separately for both of his convictions. Id. at *15. Because of 
these separate sentences, the 11th Circuit found that the later sentencing 
was not a “resentencing,” but related only to the second conviction. Id. at 
*15–16. The court concluded that the state trial court effectively severed 
the consolidated cases as a matter of law.  Id. at *16.  Therefore, because 
the judgments were severed, the tolling periods were similarly served as 
to each charge.  Id.  
CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit concluded that the convictions 
were severed as a matter of law upon sentencing and the statute of 
limitations period begins tolling on the date of each charge’s respective 
conviction. Id. 
 
United States v. Louis, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5066 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 
2009) 
QUESTION:  “[W]hether a federally licensed firearms dealer who 
sells a firearm to a convicted felon is subject to a sentence enhancement 
for abusing a position of public trust.” Id. at *1. 
ANALYSIS:  The court first analyzed the requirements of a position 
of public trust under the sentencing guidelines statute. Id. at *9. The 
court then applied the three factors required for a position of public trust 
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to a federally licensed firearms dealer: “professional judgment, 
discretion, and deference.” Id. at *17–18. First, the court found that to 
grant a license, the federal government does not review or warrant the 
professional judgment of a prospective licensee. Id. at *17. Second, the 
court noted that the government “has no discretion to deny a license” if 
an application meets the statutory requirements. Id. Finally, the court 
found that firearms dealers have “little, if any, professional deference” as 
to who they can sell firearms to. Id. at *18. 
CONCLUSION:  The 11th Circuit held that because none of the 
factors required for a “position of public trust” pertain to a federally 
licensed firearms dealer, there should be no sentencing enhancement.  Id. 
at *19. 
 
